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Engaging the Void
Emerson’s Essay on Experience and 
the Zen Experience of Self-Emptying
J ohn  G. Rudy
In “ The Transcendentalist”  (1842), Emerson asserts that “ if 
there is anything grand and daring in human thought or virtue, any 
reliance on the vast, the unknown; any presentiment; any extravagance 
of faith, the spiritualist adopts it as most in nature”  (Essays 197).* 
Such amplitude of mind, Emerson explains, is especially visible among 
Buddhists:
The oriental mind has always tended to this largeness. Bud­
dhism is an expression of it. The Buddhist who thanks no 
man, who says, “ do not flatter your benefactors,” but who, 
in his conviction that every good deed can by no possibility 
escape its reward, will not deceive the benefactor by preten­
ding that he has done more than he should, is a Tran seen den­
tal is t. (Essays 197)
1 Quotations o f  Emerson's essays are from the Library o f America edition: Ralph 
Waldo Emerson: Essays and Lectures, ed. Joel Porte, New York: Viking Press, 1983, 
and appear in text as Essays. Quotations o f  the journals are from The Journals and 
Miscellaneous N otebooks o f  Ralph Waldo Emerson, 13 vols., cd. William H. Gilman 
et al., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960-1977, and appear in text as 
JMN. References to the early lectures, compiled in The Early Lectures o f  Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, 3 vols., ed. Stephen E. Whicher, Robert Spiller, and Wallace E. Williams, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959-1972, appear in text as EL. 
References to The Correspondence o f  Emerson and Carlyle, cd. Joseph Slater. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1964, appear in text as Correspondence.
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Despite the confident tone of this proclamation, Emerson was uncom­
fortable with the sweeping inclusiveness of the Buddha-mind. In a jour­
nal entry for December 1842, he wrote that “ this remorseless Bud­
dhism lies all around, threatening with death and night. . . . Every 
thought, every enterprise, every sentiment, has its ruin in this horrid In­
finite which circles us and awaits our dropping into it” (JMNT. 474). 
And again, in April 1843, he associated Buddhism with “ Winter, 
Night, Sleep” and viewed it as a dark void of “ chaos”  drawing the in­
dividual towards the oblivion of “ trances, raptures, abandonment, 
ecstasy” (JMN  8: 383).
Perhaps, as some readers have declared, Emerson’s understanding 
of Buddhism at this point in his life was insufficient or confused with 
Brahmanism and Neoplatonism.2 Or possibly, as Emerson remarked in 
a letter to Carlyle, “ I only worship Eternal Buddh in the retirements & 
intermissions of Brahma”  (Correspondence 359). Both considerations 
might explain his unwillingness to treat the subject at length. More like­
ly, however, Emerson, as a relentless “ spiritualist” himself, under­
stood the enormous challenges involved in any quest after interior 
infinitudes and knew as well the futility of addressing such immensity 
of mind in terms derived from the systematic explication of philosoph­
ic and religious treatises. In 1835, for example, after reading the biog­
raphies of Swedenborg, Guyon, Fox, Luther, and Boehme, Emerson 
wrote: “ Each perceives the worthlessness of all instruction, and the 
infinity of wisdom that issues from meditation”  (JMN  5: 5). Attemp­
ting to convey the Buddhist sense of this infinity, Gyomay M. Kubose 
writes: “ Buddha’s mind is large enough to receive and accept all things
2 Emerson was probably familiar with Buddhism as early as 1833, when he attended 
Burnoufs lectures at the College Royal de France (see The Letters o f  Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, 6 vols., ed. Ralph L. Rusk, New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 
vol. 3: p. 290n; hereafter as Letters). The material in these lectures would doubtless 
have found its way into BumouPs Introduction a  Thistoire du Bouddhisme Indien, 
which began appearing in 1844, and which Emerson certainly knew. By 1846, Emerson 
knew Upham’s The History and Doctrine o f  Buddhism (1829) well enough to recom­
mend it as the “ principal book” on the subject, though he regarded the text as an “ im­
perfect apparatus” (Letters 3: 360-61). References to Buddhism, though brief, appear 
throughout the Emerson canon (see, for example, Essays 357, JM N  1: 363; 12; 143, 
and Letters 3: 91; 6:174).
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just as the ocean receives all the dirty waters of the rivers and purifies 
them. . . . There are no tensions or complexes of any kind in the great 
ocean-mind” (7%e Center Within, Union City, CA: 1986: 46). For so­
meone like Emerson, the appeal of this mind-state must be measured 
against the sacrifices it demands. If Emerson was a high spiritualist 
committed to a pursuit of the infinite, he was also an active participant 
in the business of culture, an individual who read voraciously, who 
dealt in ideas, who not only gloried in the word, but who made his liv­
ing by it, who valued Plato, Montaigne, and Kant among countless 
other writers. To such an individual, the oceanic dimensions of the 
Buddha-mind, with its ability to eliminate all tensions, would also ap­
pear, at least on the surface, to obliterate all distinctions in a void of 
cultural nihilism.
Nevertheless, Emerson’s pursuit of the vast and the unknown, to use 
his own vocabulary, had deep roots in his life and drew him on despite 
his fears. “ All loss, all pain is particular,” he declared in the winter of 
1836-37 in his “ Ethics”  lecture; “ the universe remains to the heart 
unhurt. . . . For it is only the finite has wrought and suffered; the 
infinite lies stretched in smiling repose” (EL 2: 144-45). The ideas es­
poused in this lecture can be traced to the so-called Goose Pond 
Manifesto of 1836.3 Of the eight principles set forth in this manifesto, 
the first two deal with mind in terms that reveal both the attractiveness 
of Emerson’s quest and the difficulties it entails: “ 1. There is one mind 
common to all men. 2. There is a relation between man and nature so 
that whatever is in matter is in mind”  (EL 2: 4-5). Significantly, the 
preposition between is subordinate to the more demanding, more 
troublesome preposition in. If the first of these principles announces 
the commonality of mind among humans, the second points beyond 
the duality of relationship between mind and matter to the radical con­
tinuity or identity of the two. Emerson’s understanding of this continui­
ty surfaces in “ The Transcendentalist” in reference to the Buddhist’s 
refusal to flatter his benefactors. As true compassion results neither 
from adherence to moral precepts nor from a separately existing 
human will to generosity, so the mind that such compassion manifests
J I am indebted to Robert D. Richardson, Jr., for his discussion o f  the Goose Pond 




is of the nature of life itself. What we know of the spirit is a function of 
practical experience, not simply of principles gleaned from religious 
and philosophical texts. If Emerson knew the Buddhistic amplitude of 
mind, he also knew the leading principle of its expression. The Dia­
mond Sutra states the case succinctly: “ As to any Truth-declaring 
system, Truth is undeclarable; so ‘an enunciation of Truth’ is just the 
name given to it.”  The journal entries in which Emerson disparages 
Buddhism suggest more importantly that his wrestling with the “ horrid 
Infinite” into which ideas, enterprises, sentiments, and even in­
dividuals fall had by 1843 passed well beyond the stage of conceptual 
engagement to that of lived experience.
The profile of this experience corresponds remarkably with that of 
the practicing Zennist in his moments of greatest doubt just before the 
instant of illumination during which he drops through all sense of a 
separate self and its reliance on conceptual schemas into the creative 
void of cosmic being. Describing this period of radical skepticism, the 
Zen master Hakuin (1686-1769) writes: “ Suddenly a great doubt 
manifested itself before me. It was as though I were frozen solid in the 
midst of an ice sheet extending tens of thousands of miles.” Giving 
himself completely to this doubt, however, and without thought of or 
hope for conceptual relief, Hakuin, awakening suddenly to the wonder 
of eternal being as the ground of his own existence, proclaims loudly: 
“ Wonderful, wonderful. There is no cycle of birth and death through 
which one must pass. There is no enlightenment one must seek” (Yam­
polsky trans.). Emerson’s “ Experience,”  published in October 1844, 
records a similar process of doubt leading first to self-loss and then to a 
wondrous sense of cosmic plenitude as the lived reality of the moment. 
A Zen reading of the essay refines our understanding of what Emerson 
knew of Buddhism and yields a vital religious and philosophical con­
text for exploring Emerson’s spiritual life as it centered on his efforts to 
resolve the tensions between the individual’s love of ideas and the 
spiritualist’s quest for the infinite.
From a purely textual and intellectual perspective, much of what 
Emerson knew of Buddhism by 1844 came to him through his reading 
in Burnouf and through a joint effort with Thoreau to glean key 
passages from a selection of important Oriental texts and to publish 
them in The Dial over a two-year period from 1842 to 1844. The work 
on Buddhism, which fell primarily to Thoreau, appeared in the
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January 1844 issue of The Dial under the title “ The Preaching of Bud­
dha.”  The text was a compilation of sayings culled from a French 
translation of the “ White Lotus of the Good Law” (392-401) and was 
prefixed with a brief extract of an article by Eugene M. Bumouf “ on 
the origin of Buddhism” (391-92). Based on this work alone, Emerson 
would have been substantively familiar with two important concepts in 
Buddhism: first, in the words of Robert Linssen, that “ Everything 
moves, is transformed, both materially and psychologically”  and, sec­
ond, that all things are void or empty of identity, that, to rely again on 
Linssen, “ There is not really any continuous entity always identical 
with itself but a perpetually changing succession of ‘cause and effect’ ” 
(Living Zen, trans. D. A. Curiel, New York: 1958: 50). Bumouf ex­
presses the first of these principles as Buddha’s “ opinion . . . that the 
visible world is in a perpetual change; that death proceeds to life, and 
life to death . . .”  (“ Preaching”  391). The second and more difficult 
principle appears throughout the cuttings in several references to the 
void and in several parables, one of which goes as follows:
It is . . .  as when a potter makes different pots of the same 
clay. Some become vases to contain molasses, others are for 
clarified butter, others for milk, others for curds, others in­
ferior and impure vases. The variety does not belong to the 
clay, it is only the difference of the substance we put in them, 
whence comes the diversity of the vases. So there is really only 
one vehicle, which is the vehicle of Buddha; there is no sec­
ond, no third vehicle. (“ Preaching” 393)
Buddhist thought is grounded in the perceived impermanence of all 
beings, things, and phenomena. Because all is change, nothing can be 
said to have self-existence or existential particularity. The nature of 
everything, so far as anything can be said to have a nature at all, is emp­
tiness (sunyata)—2l ubiquitous, eternally undivided, ineffable ground 
variously called the Void, the Buddha-mind, the Buddha-nature, the 
Unborn, or the Absolute. The Prajnaparamita Sutra, a text recited dai­
ly in Zen monasteries throughout the world, states the thesis in the con­
text of a seemingly paradoxical assertion that eliminates all thought of 
self-nature, including the possibility of anything, of any perceivable 
or even allegeable presence lurking behind the processes of life and 
making them happen: “ Form here is only emptiness, emptiness only
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form. Form is no other than emptiness, emptiness no other than form. 
Feeling, thought, and choice, consciousness itself, are no other than 
this”  (Kapleau trans.).
For the Buddhist, however, the Void is not vacuity or absence, nor is 
it cause for anxiety. Perception of the Void is, rather, freedom realized 
as the ontological ground of existence. “ Zen is the essence of Bud­
dhism, freedom is the essence of Zen,”  says Thomas Cleary. In a later 
refinement of this definition, Cleary explains that “ liberation of the 
human mind from the inhibiting effects of mesmerism by its own crea­
tions is the essence of Zen” (Zen Essence: The Science o f Freedom, ed. 
T. Cleary, Boston: Shambhala, 1989, xv, 80). Emerson would have 
seen this concept of freedom expressed more poetically, perhaps, in 
“The Preaching of Buddha” : “ The four medicinal plants are these 
four truths; namely, the state of void, the absence of a cause, the 
absence of an object, and the entrance into annihilation” (397). The 
source of Buddhist liberation is the realization that there is no such 
thing as self, that the very concept of self-existence is delusive. Asser­
ting that people are so reliant upon the perceived need of a self that 
they will fabricate a “ supposititious Self and use it disastrously as the 
living centre of their behavior,” Nolan Pliny Jacobson, in Buddhism: 
the Religion o f Analysis, argues that “ all minds have, in fact, the great 
‘stream of Being’ as their indispensable condition; it is this life-con­
tinuum, and not a unitary soul or self, which sustains each individual 
in his struggle” (83). The life continuum Jacobson here exalts in place 
of self as the vital center of existence emerges not as a form of nihilism 
but as a condition of universal interdependence. Eihei DO gen, a thir­
teenth-century priest and philosopher generally credited with founding 
the SdtO school of Zen, views the Buddhist understanding of continuum 
as a process of self-forgetting and concurrently as a means by which 
the universe of myriad things realizes itself through the individual: “ To 
study the buddha way is to study the self. To study the self is to forget 
the self. To forget the self is to be actualized by myriad things”  (Moon 
in a Dewdrop: Writings o f Zen Master Dogen, ed. K. Tanahashi, San 
Francisco: 1985: 70). For Buddhists throughout the world, freedom 
from self is identity with all things, a means by which the perceived har­
mony of life is the actual lived and living center of one’s being. The 
“ Ocean Seal” of Uisang (A.D. 625-702), the First Patriarch of Korean 
Hua-yen Buddhism, describes this vital cosmic unity as a mode of inter-
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being: “ In One is All /  In Many is One.”  But this concept of interbeing 
is predicated on the essential identity of all things: “ One is identical to 
All, /  Many is identical to One.”  The unity Uisang here celebrates is 
not a monotheistic oneness resulting from a separate organizing force, 
principle, or logos, but a nondualistic harmony realized in the com­
plete interdependency of everything. As Abe Masao explains: “ Mono­
theistic oneness does not include the element of self-negation and is 
substantial, whereas nondualistic oneness includes self-negation and is 
nonsubstantial”  (“ The Problem of Self-Centeredness as the Root 
Source of Human Suffering,” in Japanese Religions 15 (July 1989): 
15-25; cited from pp. 24-25).
Emerson’s “ Experience”  articulates a path to the Zen condition of 
enlightened selflessness Abe describes. The essay opens with a famous 
image of the self trapped “ in a series of which we do not know the ex­
tremes” and moving upon a set of stairs that “ go upward and out of 
sight” (471). The early stages of the essay depict the human condition 
as one of epistemological insecurity grounded in the apparent im­
possibility of our knowing anything about life. “ Ghostlike we glide 
through nature, and should not know our place again,”  Emerson says 
in the first paragraph, and then repeats his claim in the second with 
“ We do not know today whether we are busy or idle” (471). In the 
third paragraph, following a reference to the death of his son, Emerson 
complains that even “ grief can teach me nothing, nor carry me one 
step into real nature” (473). The direction of his thought concludes in 
paragraph four with a dark judgment on the entire process of change: 
“ I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them 
slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most 
unhandsome part of our condition” (473).
The implied subtext in these early paragraphs is a quest for per­
manence and stability in an endlessly changing and unstable world. All 
things change, including one’s moods. But the persona of these open­
ing paragraphs—a figure best viewed perhaps as a strategic composite 
of Emerson himself and a rhetorical ego serving as the occasional “ I” 
of his sentences—cannot accept this change, for he sees it from the 
viewpoint of an opposing self, desirous that its experiences teach it 
something about “ real nature.” The very idea that experience should 
culminate in something more “ real” than the existential pulse of the 
moment, that it should be answerable, as it were, to the individual’s
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need for meaning, particularly in compensation for pain and loss, ex­
alts the self above the life it seeks to understand, compelling reflective 
expectations that only widen the perceived gap between the individual 
as thinker and her experience as a living organism. This radical dualism 
of self and other, together with efforts to extract from experience ob­
ject lessons in metaphysics, results in profound suffering, in grief that 
even grief has nothing to teach. The source of this suffering is, accord­
ing to Lama Anagarika Govinda, a mode of ego-assertion that uses 
knowledge to grasp reality for the self: “ It is not the ‘world’ or its tran­
sitoriness which is the cause of suffering but our attitude towards it, 
our clinging to it, our thirst, our ignorance” (The Psychological A t­
titude o f Early Buddhist Philosophy, London: 1961: 55). We see this 
“ thirst,” this “ clinging,”  in Emerson’s disappointment that the 
“ evanescence and lubricity of all objects” allow them to slip “ through 
our fingers.” From the Zen perspective, however, there are no mutual­
ly exclusive categories of self and other, thus no opportunity to view 
the self as in any way outside what might be construed as “ real 
nature.” Zen ontology is predicated, rather, on the understanding 
that, in Thomas Merton’s words, “The fundamental reality is neither 
external nor internal, objective nor subjective. It is prior to all differen­
tiations and contradictions. . . . The mature grasp of the primordial 
emptiness in which all things are one is Prajna, wisdom” (Zen and the 
Birds o f  Appetite, New York: 1986: 68).
Emerson begins a journey to Prajna when he opens paragraph five 
with the assertion that “ Dream delivers us to dream, and there is no 
end to illusion. Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, and, as 
we pass through them, they prove to be many-colored lenses which 
paint the world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its 
focus” (473). In claiming that “ Dream delivers us to dream,” Emerson 
initiates the process of dissociating himself from the dualistic belief in a 
separately existing “ real nature” that functions either as the goal of 
human experience or as a universal, indwelling elan vital or anima 
motivating all things toward some presumed end. We might say that 
Emerson begins divesting himself of what Newton Arvin, attempting 
to define Transcendentalism, calls “ a purely idealistic belief in an 
ultimate spiritual reality, an impersonal and timeless Absolute, a 
transcendent One” (“ Ralph Waldo Emerson: 1803-1882,” in Major 
Writers o f America, Vol. 1, ed. Perry Miller et al., New York: 1962.
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477-891: 481).4 So far as all is illusion, and human existence motion 
through illusion, life emerges as an empty ground or what the modem 
Zen philosopher Nishitani Keiji calls a “ horizon of nihility”  (Religion 
and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt, Berkeley: 1982: 4). The 
recognition of this eternally shifting ground, what Emerson identifies 
as a train of moods, leaves the covetous ego with nothing to cling to, 
no place to rest. For the Zennist, however, the individual's encounter 
with this field of nihility at the ground of existence is not an occasion 
for despair. Rather, it marks, again in the words of Nishitani, “a con­
version from the self-centered (or man-centered) mode of being, which 
always asks what use things have for us (or for man), to an attitude 
that asks for what purpose we ourselves (or man) exist” (ibid., 4-5). A 
similar conversion surfaces in paragraph five of “ Experience” when 
Emerson commences a series of questions for which there can be no 
answers acceptable to the intellect but which offer nevertheless a 
methodology that preserves the seeker from despair as she commits to 
motion through illusion. “Of what use is fortune or talent to a cold 
and defective nature?”  asks Emerson. “ Who cares what sensibility or 
discrimination a man has at some time shown, if he falls asleep in his 
chair; or if he laugh and giggle . . .  or has gotten a child in his
4 Most commentators view the relationship between the self and the “ timeless Ab­
solute" o f  Transcendental oneness in what Zennists would see as unavoidably dualistic 
terms. Anthony J. Cascardi, for example, employs a Kantian perspective in claiming 
that “ The abiding or ‘transcendental' self cannot o f  course be located in experience, 
and for roughly the same reasons that Kant argues: it must stand outside experience, 
must precede actual experience, if it is to form the grounds o f  any possible experience" 
(“ The Logic o f  Moods: An Essay on Emerson and Thoreau," in SiR  24, Summer 
1985: pp. 223-37; cited from p. 229). Lawrence Buell reveals a similarly dualistic 
posture in viewing Emerson as caught or trapped in language, "forced, by the condi­
tions o f  oral performance, to recognize the difficulty o f  extricating his personal voice 
from intertextual bondage" (New England Literary Culture from  Revolution through 
Renaissance, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 161). Particularly 
insightful pages o f  comparison and contrast between Zen and Kantian metaphysics as 
both relate to  Western thought in general occur in Abe (Zen and Western Thought, 83- 
134). Amelie Enns, pursuing the relationship between Heidegger’s theory o f language 
and that o f  Zen, argues that "the division between subject and object is built right into 
Western language . . . "  ("The Subject-Object Dichotomy in Heidegger's A Dialogue 
on Language and Nishitani’s Religion and Nothingness ”  in Japanese Religions 15, 
1988: 38-48; cited from p. 45).
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boyhood?”  (474). After questioning the use of genius and of heroic 
vows, Emerson turns finally to the religious sentiment with a question 
that annihilates any distinction between humankind and nature: 
“ What cheer can the religious sentiment yield, when that is suspected 
to be secretly dependent upon the seasons of the year, and the state of 
the blood?”  (474). Following his assertion that life is a dream compris­
ing an endless train of illusions, these questions, both in their method 
and in their effect on Emerson, are remarkably similar to Zen koans. 
The koan is a seemingly paradoxical question, problem, or anecdote 
that the Zen student, particularly in the so-called Rinzai tradition, is 
assigned to meditate on. Typical koans may ask questions like “ What 
is the sound of one hand?” or “ What was your original face before 
you were born?”  Others may involve a brief story, as in “ JOshQ’s 
‘Mu’ ” : “ A monk once asked Master JOshff, ‘Has a dog the Buddha 
Nature or not?* JdshO said, ‘M u!’ ”  Mu is a bewildering and nearly un­
translatable word vaguely corresponding to “ not”  and evoking 
roughly the concept of nothingness. The student may contemplate such 
a koan for years, not with a view to acquiring an intellectual under­
standing of JdshQ’s response so much as with the intention of achiev­
ing a spiritual breakthrough into an entirely different mode of percep­
tion. “ Mumon exhorts the Zen student to work at m u,”  says T. P. 
Kasulis, “ to become it, rather than to understand it”  (Zen Action, Zen 
Person, Honolulu: 1981: 11). The koan’s purpose, so far as it can be 
said to have a purpose, is to help the individual annihilate all sense of 
separation between himself and his environment, his mental as well as 
his physical environment. The student awakens to discover that there 
was no problem to begin with. “ There is no knot because the ‘mind 
seeking to know the mind’ or the ‘self seeking to control the se lf has 
been defeated out of existence and exposed for the abstraction which 
it always was,”  explains Alan Watts. “ And when that tense knot 
vanishes there is no more sensation of a hard core of selfhood standing 
over against the rest of the world”  (The Way o f  Zen, New York: 1957: 
166).
Like JOshu, whose response eludes the dualisms implicit in a simple 
yes or no, Emerson veers from an intellectual answer to his own ques­
tions and from the interrogative mode itself, launching an assault on 
human temperament, the final refuge of selfhood. “Temperament . . . shuts 
us in a prison of glass which we cannot see”  (474), he says in the sixth
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paragraph. Complaining that for all people temperament forms “ boun­
daries they will never pass,”  he asserts in the next paragraph that 
“ Temperament puts all divinity to rout” (474-75). Clearly, Emerson 
has passed from a purely intellectual to a religious frame of mind. 
Much in the manner of the Zen student brought to an abyss of com­
plete frustration over questions she must become rather than answer, 
Emerson can do nothing but plunge through the self as an observer 
might watch the passing train of his own moods, aware of them, 
wondering who or what is watching them, but allowing them never­
theless to go by. The process of self-observation is thus a yielding, an 
act of giving up not only the quest for a definitive mood, image, or 
theory on which to found identity but also the quest for identity itself. 
In effect, Emerson gives up the very process of the knowing mode as it 
relates to the traditionally bounded or circumscribed self. “ The 
grossest ignorance does not disgust like this impudent knowingness,” 
he says, while condemning phrenologists, physicians, and, by implica­
tion, the entire secular community of knowledge-seekers: “ But the 
definition of spiritual should be, that which is its own evidence" (475; 
italics Emerson's).
Emerson's efforts to escape human temperament first by questioning 
its logic and effect, then by condemning it as a power of limitation 
parallel the Buddhist’s struggle to achieve a generative openness as the 
grounds of his being, a productive emptiness comprising not a specific 
presence but simply presence itself. From the Zen perspective, Emer­
son affirms through a discursive via negativa what Huang-po, a 
famous ninth-century “ Chan” (Zen) patriarch, calls “ the One Mind, 
which is the substance of all things, is co-extensive with the Void and 
fills the world of phenomena” (Blofeld trans.). Asserting that one- 
mindedness manifests itself more as a path or method than as a specific 
state of being, Huang-po maintains that “ the way of the Buddhas 
flourishes in a mind utterly freed from conceptual thought processes, 
while discrimination between this and that gives birth to a legion of 
demons”  (127). For the mind freed of “ conceptual thought proc­
esses,”  the act of seeing and the thing seen are perfectly continuous. To 
see in the contextual freedom Buddhist thought inspires is to see one's 
self-nature, but in a state completely beyond selfhood understood as 
ego or even as indwelling cosmic soul. To be fully awake is to be utterly 
transparent, not something seeing as from the viewpoint of a stable
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central consciousness, but the very act of seeing. Thus, D. T. Suzuki 
writes: “ So long as the seeing is something to see, it is not the real one; 
only when the seeing is no-seeing—that is, when the seeing is not a 
specific act of seeing into a definitely circumscribed state of con­
sciousness—is it the ‘seeing into one’s self-nature’”  (The Zen Doctrine 
o f No-Mind^ London: 1983: 28-29). The “ no-seeing” that Suzuki here 
describes corresponds to Emerson’s view of the spiritual as “that 
which is its own evidence. ” It is to see without the distorting energies 
of a self motivated by separate emotional and intellectual needs and 
desires. So far as we can speak here of a self at all, it is, rather, that 
which, in Huang-po’s terms, “ fills the world of phenomena” or what 
DOgen affirms in the ShObOgenzO when he says that “ The way the self 
arrays itself is the form of the entire world” (Moon in a Dewdrop, p. 
77). Commenting on this line from DOgen, Joan Stambaugh says: 
“ The self set out in array . . .  is, so to speak, a meeting-place or con­
fluence for the presencing of all things in a total situation”  (Imper­
manence Is Buddha-Nature: DOgen ’s Understanding o f  Temporality, 
Honolulu: 1990: 28).
For Emerson, freedom from temperament is freedom from cir­
cumscribed consciousness and forms the essential ground of religious 
experience. The result is an awakening to intellectual powers infinitely 
greater than those which the separate self, in its “ impudent know­
ingness,” can possibly realize. It is not surprising, therefore, that short­
ly after condemning the secular community of his day, Emerson, in 
describing his new intellectual awareness, employs imagery recalling 
Huang-po’s reference to discriminatory thought as giving “ birth to a 
legion of demons.” “The intellect,” says Emerson at the end of 
paragraph seven, “ seeker of absolute truth . . . intervenes for our suc­
cor, and at one whisper of these high powers, we awake from ineffec­
tual struggles with this nightmare. We hurl it into its own hell, and can­
not again contract ourselves to so base a state” (476). To awaken from 
the nightmare of selfhood is to cast out the demons of discriminatory 
thought.
The existential hallmark of this radical wakefulness is a serene and 
abiding acceptance beyond yet inclusive of such apparent dualisms as 
self and other, reality and illusion, change and permanence. Hence, the 
seemingly paradoxical opening to paragraph eight:
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The secret of illusoriness is the necessity of a succession of 
moods or objects. Gladly we would anchor, but the an­
chorage is quicksand. . . . Our love of the real draws us to 
permanence, but health of body consists in circulation, and 
sanity of mind in variety or facility of association. We need 
change of objects. Dedication to one thought is quickly 
odious. (476)
The flexible, accepting, health-conscious persona of these sentences 
contrasts sharply with the self Emerson depicted earlier as a ghostlike 
being stranded in a trenchant teleology, moving along the inclinations 
of a perceived need for some good end or other, some first cause 
available to the groping intellect. In paragraph eight, Emerson jet­
tisons the very self trapped on the stairs by accepting the illusoriness of 
life and its endless succession of moods as the requisite, ever-shifting 
contents of consciousness. In so doing, he moves beyond all notions of 
a stable central life and of containment on any level, writing instead 
from the viewpoint of change itself.5 The result is a much more 
unitary, Buddhistic perspective on reality: “ A Buddhist does not think 
about the world, as a subject surveying a range of objects,” says Jacob­
son in Buddhism & the Contemporary World*, “ the point is to think in 
the world, as part of its organic unity” (9).
The new power that engages Emerson, that takes him up, as it were, 
is one that abides nowhere. In its freedom from intentionality, it eludes 
all containments. “ Like a bird which alights nowhere,” says Emerson 
at the end of paragraph ten, “ but hops perpetually from bough to 
bough, is the Power which abides in no man and in no woman, but for
5 Emerson’s readers have difficulty accepting the decentering process of “ Ex­
perience” ; see for example David Wyatt, “ Spelling Time: The Reader in Emerson’s 
Circles,”  in On Emerson: The Best from  American Literature, ed. Edwin H . Cady and 
Louis J. Budd, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 171-82; especially pp. 
181-82). Much of the problem inheres in the Western tendency to reify Emersonian 
emptiness as “ a chasm o f nothingness between shifting modes o f selfhood”  and as a 
“ vacuum between points o f truth”  (Robert M . Greenberg, “ Shooting the Gulf: Emer­
son’s Sense o f Experience,”  in ESO 31, 1985 : 211-29; cited from p. 211). Richard 
Poirier views Emerson’s nothingness as a content against which artists assert 
themselves in obedience to the “ human desire to make its presence known to itself and 
to the world. . .”  (The Renewal o f  Literature: Emersonian Reflections, New Haven: 













a moment speaks from this one, and for another moment from that 
one” (477). If “ Experience” rejects the self, it also rejects absoluteness 
as stability, accepting impermanence itself as the absolute. It comes as 
close as any Western document to the Zen claim that “ Impermanence 
is Buddha-nature” (Stambaugh 26), that the “ Mind is no mind of con­
ceptual thought and it is completely detached from form” (Huang-po 
33), and, finally, that the mind is the “ ‘Non-abiding Origin’ through 
which all things are established” (Abe, Zen and Western Thought, ed. 
Wm. R. LaFleur, Honolulu: 1985, 117). Like the sourceless energies of 
the enlightened Buddhist mind-state, the power Emerson engages at 
the end of paragraph ten generates, in the absence of a discernible self, 
an essentially reflective mentality notably free of ulterior intellectual 
purposes, of any quest for meaning, stability, and plan in the universe. 
The remainder of the essay, which should be read in response to 
the first ten paragraphs, evokes a discursive open ground in which 
divergent, even contrary thoughts, moods, and images surface not 
to compete with each other for attention but simply to appear and 
dissolve in the onward flow of the language of the moment as it alter­
nates between liberative skepticism and muscular affirmation. “ What 
help from thought?” Emerson asks in the eleventh paragraph, and 
then responds with “ Life is not dialectics. . . . Unspeakably sad and 
barren does life look to those, who a few months ago were dazzled with 
the splendor of the promise of the times” (478). Emerson’s skepticism 
here complements such affirmations as “ To fill the hour,—that is hap­
piness; to fill the hour, and leave no crevice for a repentance or an ap­
proval. We live amid surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate well on 
them” (478). Skepticism varies into affirmation; affirmation flows 
again to skepticism: “ Life itself is a bubble and a skepticism, and a 
sleep within a sleep” (481).
Significantly, neither skepticism nor affirmation dominates “ Ex­
perience.” 6 “ I accept the clangor and jangle of contrary tendencies,” 
says Emerson, and then asserts that “ The middle region of our being is
4 Elizabeth Tebeaux views Emerson’s philosophical skepticism here as “ an attitude 
essential to the process o f  truth seeking” (“Skepticism and Dialectic in Emerson’s ’Ex­
perience,’” ESO  32 (1986): 23-35., p. 29). She sees Emerson as pursuing the truth in 
“ a web o f discontinuity” (ibid., p. 33), the result, perhaps, o f  her conviction that “ on­







the temperate zone”  (480). We tend to think of a middle region as a 
point between two extremes or as an energy field that balances polar op­
posites. But Emerson does not speak of balance. He talks, rather, of ac­
ceptance. In this sense, his middle region corresponds to the oceanic 
consciousness described by the early Zen master Ma-tsu: “ When suc­
cessive thoughts do not await one another, and each thought dies 
peacefully away, this is called absorption in the oceanic reflection” 
(Cleary 2). This reflective absorption is not, however, a condition of 
despair or a form of anti-intellectualism. It is, rather, a function of 
radical independence at the very ground of existence and consciousness 
so mingled as to be virtually identical. Thus, Hui-neng (638-713) 
writes: “ We say that the Essence of Mind is great because it embraces 
all things, since all things are within our nature”  (26). Hui-neng*s asser­
tion is itself a reflection of and comment on The Diamond Sutra, which 
counsels that “ The mind should be kept independent of any thoughts 
which arise within it.”  Later in his essay, Emerson will celebrate this 
magnitude of mind by insisting that skepticism is a positive and 
liberating force:
The new statement will comprise the skepticisms, as well as 
the faiths of society. . . . For, skepticisms are not gratuitous 
or lawless, but are limitations of the affirmative statement, 
and the new philosophy must take them in, and make affirma­
tions outside of them, just as much as it must include the 
oldest beliefs. (487)
On this shifting ground of affirmation and skepticism, the develop­
ing thrust of the essay evokes a perception of relationship radically 
different from that generated by the traditional conceptual schemas of 
Western thought. Winston L. King remarks that the “ Cartesian divi­
sion of reality into immaterial, invisible, subjective consciousness and 
material, visible objectivity is the epitome of Western thought. . . . 
Out of this climate has arisen the Western dichotomous type of logical 
assertion that A is not, cannot be B” (Foreword to Religion and 
Nothingness, xi). In breaking through the very concept of selfhood ear­
ly in “ Experience,”  however, Emerson implicitly rejects the dichotomy 
King describes and affirms instead a unity and a mode of consciousness 
grounded in motion itself, in an emptiness of flux:
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If I have described life as a flux of moods, I must now add, 
that there is that in us which changes not, and which ranks all 
sensations and states of mind. The consciousness in each man 
is a sliding scale, which identifies him now with the First 
Cause, and now with the flesh of his body; life above life, in 
infinite degrees (485).
The sliding-scale consciousness, indistinguishable as it is from the 
“ flux of moods’* that constitutes the very life whence it comes, works 
not to illuminate but to identify, not to define Emits but to destabilize 
boundaries and affirm infinitudes. Here, skepticism and affirmation, 
like the particular and the general or like devotion both to First Cause 
and to flesh, fold upon each other in an amorphous unity of nondistinc­
tion similar to what Nishitani calls “ circuminsessional interpenetra­
tion** (ibid., 148). This is not a denial of autonomy, but an affirmation 
of being in a context that collapses individual and cosmic existence into 
a state beyond the traditional relational models of Western systems of 
unity. “ In short,”  says Nishitani, “ it is only on a field where the being 
of all things is a being at one with emptiness that it is possible for all 
things to gather into one, even while each retains its reality as an ab­
solutely unique being” (ibid., 148).
Nishitani’s “ field” is Emerson’s “ ocean.” “ Suffice it for the joy of 
the universe,”  Emerson says in paragraph sixteen, “ that we have not 
arrived at a wall, but at interminable oceans” (486). Here, communica­
tion between gives way to the implosive communication of one thing 
in or as another: “ lam  explained without explaining, I am felt without 
acting, and where I am not” (486). To insist on oneself, on one’s 
autonomy, in this state of oceanic consciousness is to be affirmed by all 
others. Communication so conceived is not a directive act of one thing 
towards another but a mode of being in which one thing folds upon or 
emerges from within another. Hence, Emerson’s claim that “ all just 
persons . . . communicate without speech, above speech . . . ” (486). 
Robert E. Carter, commenting on Nishitani’s field of nihility as the 
common ground of identity shared by all beings, sees identity-based 
communication in terms closely resembling Emerson’s reference to be­
ing “ felt without acting” and without signaling proximity:
Individual and whole, birth and death are but aspects of the
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same reality, and the one is inextricably connected with the 
other because each is the other. Each interpenetrates each and 
is in turn interpenetrated. . . .  I care about another as I care 
about myself because I am, in fact, the other. The result 
is clearly a cosmic compassion. . . . {God, the Self and 
Nothingness: Reflections: Eastern and Western, ed. Robert 
E. Carter, New York: 1990, p. xxxi)
In the absence of selfhood perceived as having objective existence, 
the power Emerson describes in paragraph ten services a creative unity 
beyond all notions of self and other as relative phenomena:
The great and crescive self, rooted in absolute nature, sup­
plants all relative existence, and ruins the kingdom of mortal 
friendship and love. Marriage (in what is called the spiritual 
world) is impossible, because of the inequality between every 
subject and every object. The subject is the receiver of God­
head, and at every comparison must feel his being enhanced 
by that cryptic might. (487-88)
The subject of these lines is rapacious and threatening only so far as we 
conceive its contents as having objective existence. From the Zen 
perspective, the self rooted in absolute nature, which is itself in con­
stant flow, is radically free of essence, hence of threat. “ Our true self is 
the Great Self; our true body is the Body of reality,”  says Ruth Fuller 
Sasaki, an American Zennist (qtd. in Nancy Wilson Ross, Three Ways 
o f Asian Wisdom: Hinduism, Buddhism and Zen and their Signifi­
cance fo r the West, New York: 1966: 145). In this context, relation­
ship is not, cannot be a function of the linking or joining of two objects, 
as in a marriage; it is, rather, a function of identity in a held of 
mutual polarities. “ While it is necessary for one to be accurate and 
refined in one’s discrimination of apparent opposites in daily life,” 
says Chang Chung-yuan, “ it is even more important for one 
simultaneously to recognize the invisible, mutual solution of multipli­
cities and the perfect identification of polarities” (Introduction: The 
Meaning of Tao and Its Reflection in Western Thought, in Tao: A 
New Way o f  Thinking, New York: 1975, xv-xvi). Such identification re­
places empathy or transference of feeling from one being to another and 
displaces marriage as the metaphor of relationships: “ Transference
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or participation is based upon the dualistic interpretation of reality 
whereas the identity goes more fundamentally into the root of existence 
where no dichotomy in any sense has yet taken place,”  says D. T. 
Suzuki (Mysticism Christian and Buddhist, London: 1957: 76). Emer­
son states this perception more forcefully when, near the end of “ Ex­
perience,”  he says: “ All I know is reception; I am and I have: but I do 
not get, and when I have fancied I had gotten anything, I found I did 
not. I worship with wonder the great Fortune” (491).
Emerson’s pious sense of wonder here is conveyed through deliber­
ately primitive verb structures ( “ I am and I have” ) that emphasize 
being and identity rather than questing for roles or for hidden prin­
ciples that impel the experience of the moment. His receptivity, like 
that of the “ subject” he described earlier as “ the receiver of God­
head,” is absolute and sufficient unto itself because it is, to use Sasa­
ki’s vocabulary, the “ Body of reality” itself. Emerson understands 
that he is himself the “great Fortune” he worships with wonder.
Zen philosophy is particularly useful in helping us understand that 
such perceptions are not merely solipsistic reveries but forms of 
religious experience in which knowing emerges as a mode of actualiza­
tion, what Nishitani calls “ the self-awareness of reality” (5). Adopting 
the English word “ realize,” with its twofold meaning of “ actualize” 
and “ understand,” Nishitani says that “ our ability to perceive reality 
means that reality realizes (actualizes) itself in us . . .” (Religion and 
Nothingness: 5). This mode of perception differs from philosophical 
cognition in that it is basically a two-way process of appropriation: 
reality appropriates us in realizing itself through us, and we in turn ap­
propriate reality in realizing that we and it are essentially one and the 
same. I am all that I realize; all that I realize appropriates itself through 
me. For Nishitani, this mode of seeing is itself the spiritual life: “ It is 
extremely rare for us so to ‘fix our attention’ on things as to ‘lose 
ourselves’ in them . . .  to become the very things we are looking at. To 
see through them directly to ‘God’s world,’ or to the universe in its in­
finitude, is even rarer” (ibid.: 9). Emerson’s definition of the spiritual 
as “ that which is its own evidence” constitutes his effort to see the 
“ God’s world”  of all things. To see beyond the obtrusive, distorting 
lenses of the human intellect perceived as the instrument of a separate, 
desirous, expectant self is to understand that each thing is complete in 
itself, that nothing stands behind it, impelling it, and that it is yet the
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whole cosmos. Hence, Emerson’s claim that there is a “ gulf between 
every me and thee,”  that “ All private sympathy is partial,”  and that 
“ Two human beings are like globes, which can touch only in a point. . .” 
(488). Emerson is anxious to show that “ Life will be imaged, but can­
not be divided nor doubled. Any invasion of its unity would be chaos”
(488) . Any thought of selfhood constitutes an invasion.
Critical access to this sense of unity, however, requires us to yield the 
tendency to view the essay as obedient to the opening images of loss 
and alienation.7 “ Experience”  is neither dramatic in the sense that it 
offers roles for the reader nor linear in the sense that it pursues an argu­
ment point-by-point from paragraph to paragraph. It is, rather, contex­
tual, moving like purling waters, in the manner of a stream continually 
folding back on itself, augmenting earlier statements. Near the end of 
his essay, for example, Emerson returns to the theme of subjectivity: 
“ Thus inevitably does the universe wear our color, and every object 
fall successively into the subject itself. The subject exists, the subject 
enlarges; all things sooner or later fall into place. As I am, so I see. . .”
(489) . The color of the things we see in this state is not an affect, the pro­
duct, as it were, of the subject’s intention towards a perceived object, 
but the mark of interpenetrative identity or of an awakening to the 
sourceless identity of all things—“ As I am, so I see.”  Bunan, a Zen 
poet of the seventeenth century, views this condition of identity as a 
shared thingness:
The moon’s the same old moon, 
The flowers exactly as they were, 
Yet I’ve become the thingness 
Of all the things I see.
(Stryk and Ikemoto trans.)
Like the subject which absorbs all that falls into it, Emerson’s prose 
is subsumptive, a pulsation that contains the whole. The discourse 
tends to blossom or open, impelling the reader downward into a swirl-
7 For example, R. A. Yoder says: “ In ‘Experience’ Emerson is true to his initial 
awareness that the spiral stairs go upward and out o f sight, and the slumbering 
Eumenides dramatize the gap between man and god as well as the endlessness o f  that 
condition” (Emerson and the Orphic Poet in America, Berkeley, CA: University o f 
California Press, 1978, p. 47).
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ing, non-linear, dimensionless vortex in which earlier and later state­
ments form contexts for each other and invite the reader to a process of 
continual return.8 The work emerges thus as a kind of spatio-temporal 
quantum field similar in its method to the syncretic harmonization 
processes Whitehead sees functioning at the ground of existence when 
he says: “ Each actual entity is a throb of experience including the actual 
world within its scope” (Process and Reality, ed. D. R. Griffin and 
D. W. Sherburne, New York: 1978: 190). Whitehead’s vision of en­
tities as pulsatory space-time events corresponds to Zen’s perception of 
reality as a continually emergent conjunctivity in which, as Fa-tsang 
expounds, “ the one and the many established each other” (Chan 
trans.).9 Emerson’s prose in “ Experience” issues as a pulsation of 
nature in conformity with his perception, stated earlier, in paragraph 
fifteen, that “ Nature hates calculators; her methods are saltatory 
and impulsive. Man lives by pulses; our organic movements are such; 
and the chemical and ethereal agents are undulatory and alternate . . .” 
(483).
So far as we can speak of “ Experience” as having a discursive 
method at all, it embodies a process remarkably similar to the involu­
tions of Zen sermons. A particularly notable example of the form is 
Ch’ing-yuan’s famous disquisition on mountains and waters:
Before 1 studied Zen I saw mountains as mountains, waters as 
waters.
When I learned something of Zen, the mountains were no 
longer mountains, waters no longer waters.
But now that I understand Zen, I am at peace with myself, see­
ing mountains once again as mountains, waters as waters.
8 Gayle Smith remarks that Emerson’s “ is a style in which the differences, even be­
tween apparently contrary entities such as cause and effect, subject and object, action 
and inaction, are consistently blurred to reveal the One underlying all”  (“ Emerson’s 
Prose Style: Following Nature with Language,”  in ATO  56 (March 1985), pp. 19-30; 
cited from p. 20). Smith implies a dualistic understanding o f oneness in her claim that 
Emerson’s sense o f being felt where he is not is his effort to forge “ a bold new identity 
between the spirit and himself”  (ibid., p. 27).
’  For an extensive analysis o f Hua-yen Buddhism and Whiteheadian process 
memphysics, see Steve Odin, Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism: Critical 




In the first stage of awareness, the I or the ego is the basis of discrimina­
tion. In the second stage the Zen student realizes that, as Abe puts it, 
“ there is no differentiation, no objectification, no affirmation, no duali­
ty of subject and object” (Zen and Western Thought, 8). Lu Yen, an 
early Taoist poet, captures the essence of the second stage in the 
delightful assertion that “ Green mountains are white clouds /  In a pass­
ing transformation” (Blofeld trans.). There is, however, the possibility 
of a hidden form of differentiation in the second stage, a tendency to 
objectify or conceptualize the non-self as distinct from the ego-self. We 
could, for example, view the shared “ thingness” of Bunan’s enlighten­
ment as a separate condition of being. To avoid the tendency to reify 
emptiness as a thing, Buddhism insists on the absolute identity and 
indivisibility of form and void. “ Furthermore, Emptiness does not 
have any mark of its own,” says Fa-tsang; “ it is through forms that 
[Emptiness] is revealed”  (“ Treatise on the Golden Lion” 225). Hence, 
the necessity for a third stage in which, as Abe says, “ Emptiness emp­
ties itself, becoming non-emptiness, that is, true fullness” (Zen and 
Western Thought, 10). Donald Mitchell, relating Zen emptiness to 
Christian kenosis, notes that “ lived Emptiness empties itself out as 
compassion” (Spirituality and Emptiness: The Dynamics o f Spiritual 
Life in Buddhism and Christianity, New York: 1991: 121).
Regardless of the perspective, however, the third stage is involu- 
tionary and subsumptive, not the result of linear progression. It con­
tains the first and second stages and, however paradoxical it may ap­
pear, returns us to a state from which we have never really departed. 
“ The latter,” says Robert Linssen, commenting on what we are calling 
the third stage of spiritual growth, “ is devoid of any sense of progres­
sion: it is instantaneous. . . . It is a question here of an integration that 
can neither be described nor thought” (Living Zen: 252-53). This 
mode of spiritual insight reflects a sense of the temporal interpenetra­
tion of all experience, a moment of adequacy in which, as Odin 
remarks, “ Each moment-event is itself an eternal herc-now, a unique 
quantum-whole of actuality” (96). In these moment-events, there is no 
sense of past and future, no sense of linear progression from one point 
to another. Past and future fold, rather, upon the present. Comment­
ing on the “ musical perfection” beneath the perceived chaos of our 
skepticisms, beneath “ the inharmonious and trivial particulars”  of 
life, Emerson says, to recall paragraph eleven, that “ every insight from
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this realm of thought is felt as initial, and promises a sequel. I do not 
make it; I arrive there, and behold what was there already. . . . And 
what a future it opens! I feel a new heart beating with the love of the 
new beauty” (485).
So far as Emerson’s prose seeks to return us to a condition of accep­
tance perfectly identical with the very grounds of seeing and hearing, it 
moves beyond the dynamics of linear progression, beyond the notion 
of one thing’s becoming something else, and offers as the axis of 
spiritual being only the immediacy of our opening to the adequacy of 
the present moment. Robert E. Carter explains such openness in terms 
of what he calls “ self-contradictory unities” : “ I see the mountains. I 
see that there are no mountains. Therefore, I see the mountains again, 
but as transformed. And the transformation is that the mountains both 
are and are not mountains” (“ Paradox, Language, and Reality,” in 
God, the Self and Nothingness, pp. 245-264; cited from p. 255). The 
unity of subject and object Carter affirms is not the result of linear pro­
gression, as in the Hegelian effort to evolve or to make a synthesis out 
of a prior thesis and antithesis. Rather, it is predicated on belief in the 
prior unity of all things. “ To think of one thing is to distinguish it 
from the other,”  says Nishida Kitard. “ In order for the distinction to 
be possible, it must originally have something in common with the 
other” (Yusa trans.). It is the both-and structure of perception rather 
than the synthetic progress of Hegelian dialectic that Zen seeks to 
preserve in exalting a preconceptual, prelingual ground of mutual 
identity for all things and that Emerson affirms in his claim that he does 
not make thought but rather arrives there or, if you will, at the place 
where thought emerges free of the intentions and expectations of an ob­
trusive ego.10
Viewed in the light of consciousness as an ever-opening field of ac­
ceptance, Emerson’s fall, the unhappiness he records in paragraph 
eighteen at the discovery that “ we exist” and that “ we suspect our
10 Ray Benoit provides a typical Hegelian view o f unity in commenting on Emer­
son’s understanding o f Plato: “ Explicit is the dichotomy and desire for union—not 
one into the other but both into a third o f  ’spiritual creatures* and ’solid fact *: both 
into a dualism which is nevertheless monistic, a oneness o f two” (“ Emerson on Plato: 
The Fire’s Center,”  in On Emerson: The Best From American Literature, cd. Edwin 
H. Cady and Louis J. Budd, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 127-38; 
cited from p. 135).
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instruments” (487), is a fortunate event. The very assertion that 
knowledge of existence is a fall, what Emerson calls “ the Fall of 
Man,”  occurs in the discursive context of experienced non-being—a 
preconceptual state free of the very instruments, of the very energies of 
desire and repulsion that form its contents. To suspect our instruments 
is not to reject them; it is to see them in a new light and to use them 
without being captured by them, entangled by them. As The Diamond 
Sutra explains, “ The mind should be kept independent of any thoughts 
which arise within it. If the mind depends upon anything it has no sure 
haven.”
In this perspectiveless state, one comes to one’s experience, including 
one’s sadness, free of attachment to the emotion. One understands that 
true fullness is absence of expectation. “ And yet is the God the native 
of these bleak rocks,” says Emerson, after commenting on the com­
pulsive private tendency to see things as “ saturated with our humors” 
(490). If the rocks are bleak, they serve as well to return us to true 
selflessness: “ We must hold hard to this poverty, however scandalous, 
and by more vigorous self-recoveries, after the sallies of action, possess 
our axis more firmly” (490). This axis comprises a poverty of selfhood, 
not of emotional and intellectual content. As Sekida Katsuki writes: 
“ It is not that you are without desires, but that while desiring and 
adhering to things you are at the same time unattached to them” (Zen 
Training: Methods and Philosophy, ed. A. V. Grimstone, New York: 
1975: 34). If then for Emerson the life of truth is “ cold and so far 
mournful” (490), if there is sadness in his sense of the impermanence 
of things, it is a sadness that he seems now able to experience entirely 
for itself and as a gift of the moment. Zen speaks of this condition as 
aware, the sadness that inheres in the realization that things are lost to 
us even as they are found. In “ Experience,” Emerson engages sadness 
in its spiritual dimension as “ that which is its own evidence. *’ The emo­
tion, like the objects that fall into the expansive, dimensionless subject 
of paragraph twenty, exists for itself, and so can be experienced for 
itself, as part of the richness, the fullness of being at this point in time. 
In the absence of self, Emerson makes no demands upon the emotion, 
has no intellectual expectations of it, so to speak. There is only the 
freedom of acceptance. “ At times the sense of aware is so powerful,”  
says Lucien Stryk, “ that the only way of coming to terms with it is to 




and Zen, Athens, OH: 1981: xlii). In lines recalling Emerson's image of 
bleak rocks as the ground of our true Godhead, the Zen poet Jakushi- 
tsu says: “ In old age mountains /  Are more beautiful than ever. My 
resolve: /  That these bones be purified by rocks”  (qtd. in Stryk, ibid., 
60).
Not surprisingly, therefore, Emerson concludes his essay on a 
positive note, worshipping “ with wonder the great Fortune.”  The 
work that began with a dark image of the self trapped in an endless 
quest for meaning comes round to a celebrative mood o f unconditional 
acceptance o f life unhindered by the demands of an intrusive self: “ Illu­
sion, Temperament, Succession, Surface, Surprise, Reality, Subjec­
tiveness,—these are the threads on the loom of time, these are the lords 
of life”  (490-91), says Emerson near the end of his essay. The self-purg- 
ing of “ Experience”  is complete. In his new humility, Emerson asks 
nothing for himself: “ This is a fruit,—that I should not ask for a rash 
effect from meditations, counsels, and the hiving of truths” (491). 
What he acquires instead is a new sense of the refulgence and necessity 
of solitude, a realization that “ in the solitude to which every man is 
always returning, he has a sanity and revelations, which in his passage 
into new worlds he will carry with him” (492). The revelatory sanity of 
these lines invites us to revisit earlier sentences, to meditate whatever 
resistance we may have felt in the presence of such unconditional accep­
tance as Emerson reveals, say, in paragraph eleven: “ Without any 
shadow of doubt, amidst this vertigo of shows and politics, I settle 
myself ever the firmer in the creed, that we should not postpone and 
refer and wish, but do broad justice where we are, by whomsoever we 
deal with, accepting our actual companions and circumstances, 
however humble or odious, as the mystic officials to whom the universe 
has delegated its whole pleasure for us”  (479). The vertigo of this 
sentence, its downward movement through the cultural detritus of ac­
quired habits of expectation and discrimination to the deep pleasure 
ground of contentment in the moment, embodies the entire purling 
process o f the essay.
Gay Wilson Allen says that “ Emerson was too much a child o f the 
West to seek the Void as an ultimate goal, but he was increasingly 
fascinated by the Hindu doctrine of maya, the illusory appearance of 
the world”  (Wr/rfo Emerson: A  Biography, New York: 1981: 577). 
“ Experience” gives us pause to consider that much of Emerson’s abil-
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ity to cope at all with maya was the result of a continuous process of 
self-emptying in a life-long growth toward spiritual understanding. A 
key focus of this understanding was Emerson’s increasingly Buddhistic 
realization of consciousness as a transpersonal, transintellectual empty 
ground infinitely larger than the ideas that form its contents at any 
point in time and space. The structure of the last paragraph, as it 
moves from the self to the nonself and from the intellectual to the 
universal intuitive, underscores the force of this realization. “ But I 
have not found much was gained by manipular attempts to realize the 
world of thought” (492), says Emerson near the beginning of the 
paragraph. The last sentence, however, omits even the I of the thinker, 
asserting that “ the true romance which the world exists to realize, will 
be the transformation of genius into practical power” (492; italics 
mine). All our thoughts, conditions, experiences are collective, the 
culmination of an endless train of incalculable moments whose source 
is an interrelatedness with no beginning and no end. Perhaps the most 
remarkable aspect of “ Experience” is, after all, its invitation to sur­
render, as Emerson does, the very self that divides us from the 
refulgent, eternally emergent contents of individual being in order to 
engage the freedom of limitless creativity that forms the ineffable 
ground of all being, what “ the world exists to realize.”
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